davidgasquez.com
📚 Personal bits of knowledge
🧠 Link mechanism design properties to modularity
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Mechanism Design.md
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Mechanism Design.md
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- Any mechanism that can help genuinely under-coordinated parties coordinate will, without the right safeguards, also help already coordinated parties (such as many accounts controlled by the same person) [over-coordinate](https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2019/04/03/collusion.html) with potential ways to "do wrong" (e.g: extract money from the system).
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- You can increase mechanism complexity if you trade it off for identity or collusion resistance. If you figure out a way to make it the mechanism identity resistant then, it'll support more complex setups.
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- [Truthtelling games](https://jonathanwarden.com/truthtelling-games/) can incentivize honesty through coordination games where participants win by giving the same answer as others, with truth serving as a powerful Schelling point (truthtelling is the winning strategy only if everybody else tells the truth). Information elicitation mechanisms can get people to reveal private/subjective information truthfully even without verification.
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- Some of the interesting properties of a mechanism are; local/bottom up decision making, can be combined in different layers (horizontal / vertical), and [[Modularity|modularity]].
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### Examples
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- [Allocation Mechanisms](https://www.allo.expert/mechanisms)
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- [Generalized Impact Evaluators](https://research.protocol.ai/publications/generalized-impact-evaluators/ngwhitepaper2.pdf) - Framework for retrospective reward mechanisms
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- [Info Finance](https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2024/11/09/infofinance.html) - Using information aggregation for social decisions
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## Toolkit
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