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Lewis' Big Boy TODO list#

Active development#

OAuth scope authorization UI#

Display and manage OAuth scopes during authorization flows.

  • Parse and display requested scopes from authorization request
  • Human-readable scope descriptions (e.g., "Read your posts" not "app.bsky.feed.read")
  • Group scopes by category (read, write, admin, etc.)
  • Allow users to uncheck optional scopes before authorizing
  • Distinguish required vs optional scopes in UI
  • Remember scope preferences per client (don't ask again for same scopes)
  • Token endpoint respects user's scope selections
  • Protected endpoints check token scopes before allowing operations

Frontend#

So like... make the thing unique, make it cool.

  • Frontpage that explains what this thing is
  • Unique "brand" style both unauthed and authed
  • Better documentation on how to sub out the entire frontend for whatever the users want

Delegated accounts#

Accounts controlled by other accounts rather than having their own password. When logging in as a delegated account, OAuth asks you to authenticate with a linked controller account. Uses OAuth scopes as the permission model.

  • Account type flag in actors table (personal | delegated)
  • account_delegations table (delegated_did, controller_did, granted_scopes[], granted_at, granted_by, revoked_at)
  • Detect delegated account during authorize flow
  • Redirect to "authenticate as controller" instead of password prompt
  • Validate controller has delegation grant for this account
  • Issue token with intersection of (requested scopes :intersection-emoji: granted scopes)
  • Token includes act_as claim indicating delegation
  • Define standard scope sets (owner, admin, editor, viewer)
  • Create delegated account flow (no password, must add initial controller)
  • Controller management page (add/remove controllers, modify scopes)
  • "Act as" account switcher for users with delegation grants
  • Log all actions with both actor DID and controller DID
  • Audit log view for delegated account owners

Passkeys and 2FA#

Modern passwordless authentication using WebAuthn/FIDO2, plus TOTP for defense in depth.

  • passkeys table (id, did, credential_id, public_key, sign_count, created_at, last_used, friendly_name)
  • user_totp table (did, secret_encrypted, verified, created_at, last_used)
  • WebAuthn registration challenge generation and attestation verification
  • TOTP secret generation with QR code setup flow
  • Backup codes (hashed, one-time use) with recovery flow
  • OAuth authorize flow: password → 2FA (if enabled) → passkey (as alternative)
  • Passkey-only account creation (no password)
  • Settings UI for managing passkeys, TOTP, backup codes
  • Trusted devices option (remember this browser)
  • Rate limit 2FA attempts
  • Re-auth for sensitive actions (email change, adding new auth methods)

Plugin system#

Extensible architecture allowing third-party plugins to add functionality, like minecraft mods or browser extensions.

  • Research: survey Fabric/Forge, VS Code, Grafana, Caddy plugin architectures
  • Evaluate rust approaches: WASM, dynamic linking, subprocess IPC, embedded scripting (Lua/Rhai)
  • Define security model (sandboxing, permissions, resource limits)
  • Plugin manifest format (name, version, deps, permissions, hooks)
  • Plugin discovery, loading, lifecycle (enable/disable/hot reload)
  • Error isolation (bad plugin shouldn't crash PDS)
  • Extension points: request middleware, record lifecycle hooks, custom XRPC endpoints
  • Extension points: custom lexicons, storage backends, auth providers, notification channels
  • Extension points: firehose consumers (react to repo events)
  • Plugin SDK crate with traits and helpers
  • Example plugins: custom feed algorithm, content filter, S3 backup
  • Plugin registry with signature verification and version compatibility

Plugin: Private/encrypted data#

Records that only authorized parties can see and decrypt. Requires key federation between PDSes. Implemented as a plugin using the plugin system above.

  • Survey current ATProto discourse on private data
  • Document Bluesky team's likely approach
  • Design key management strategy
  • Per-user encryption keys (separate from signing keys)
  • Key derivation for per-record or per-collection encryption
  • Encrypted record storage format
  • Transparent encryption/decryption in repo operations
  • Protocol for sharing decryption keys between PDSes
  • Handle key rotation and revocation

Completed#

Core ATProto: Health, describeServer, all session endpoints, full repo CRUD, applyWrites, blob upload, importRepo, firehose with cursor replay, CAR export, blob sync, crawler notifications, handle resolution, PLC operations, did:web, full admin API, moderation reports.

OAuth 2.1: Authorization server metadata, JWKS, PAR, authorize endpoint with login UI, token endpoint (auth code + refresh), revocation, introspection, DPoP, PKCE S256, client metadata validation, private_key_jwt verification.

App endpoints: getPreferences, putPreferences, getProfile, getProfiles, getTimeline, getAuthorFeed, getActorLikes, getPostThread, getFeed, registerPush (all with local-first + proxy fallback).

Infrastructure: Sequencer with cursor replay, postgres repo storage with atomic transactions, valkey DID cache, debounced crawler notifications with circuit breakers, multi-channel notifications (email/Discord/Telegram/Signal), image processing, distributed rate limiting, security hardening.

Web UI: OAuth login, registration, email verification, password reset, multi-account selector, dashboard, sessions, app passwords, invites, notification preferences, repo browser, CAR export, admin panel.

Auth: ES256K + HS256 dual support, JTI-only token storage, refresh token family tracking, encrypted signing keys (AES-256-GCM), DPoP replay protection, constant-time comparisons.